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ABSTRACT 
 
 The Great Barrier Reef is the world’s largest coral reef ecosystem and is currently in 
danger of irreparable destruction due to natural and human-made environmental disturbance. 
This paper focuses on a case, Center for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank, concerning 
the extraterritoriality application of the Endangered Species Act to a Federal agency’s funding of 
liquefied natural gas projects in Australia requiring, in part, the dredging of portions of the Great 
Barrier Reef. As the health of UNESCO World Heritage Sites and other environmentally 
protected and culturally important geography is jeopardized, United States’ government activity 
in foreign jurisdictions raises the question as to whether agency activity (if it is agency action) 
can come under jurisdiction of United States’ courts or whether the federal activity abroad 
remains untouchable by United States jurisprudence aimed at protecting endangered habitats and 
species. The Center for Biological Diversity case, at the time of this article pending appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, presents the opportunity for a court to consider 
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality on Federal agency activity that 
substantially jeopardizes the health and preservation of endangered and culturally significant 
ecosystems under the Endangered Species Act.  
 
 
 
KEY TERMS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Growing economies, population, and modern technology have led to an increase in 
international competition for natural resources. However, the competition for oil, natural gas, and 
other natural resources has threatened the existence of one of the world’s most biologically 
diverse habitats, the Great Barrier Reef. The Great Barrier Reef is the world’s largest coral reef 
ecosystem, including more than 2,900 separate coral reefs.2 It provides a protected habitat to 
diverse and endangered species, such as six out of seven species of marine turtles, important and 
endangered dugong3 populations, more than 1500 species of fish, and many other marine species 
that comprise this diverse and expansive ecosystem.4 Recent news articles have highlighted the 
widespread coral bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef, predominately due to environmental 
disturbance; but human impact will only exacerbate the effects on the Reef’s ecosystem, 
resulting in detrimental impact to other species that depend on the Reef for sustenance.5  
This article focuses on a case in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California (Oakland Division), Center for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank of the 
United States (“Center”). 6  Center presents the question of whether a United States federal 
agency (Export-Import Bank), providing funding to international liquefied natural gas projects, 
must comply with the consultation requirements of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 
1973 (“ESA”) before funding can be secured when the actions of the project occur on the “high 
seas.”7  This comment suggests that Center’s outcome could significantly impact the United 
States’ funding of international projects by Federal agencies, the international community’s role 
in securing the future of World Heritage Convention sites, the increased protection of 
endangered ecological habitats and species, as well as potentially straining the United States’ 
relationship with international organizations.  
Part II focuses on the applicable statutory background implicated in Center, 
predominately focusing on Section 7 of the ESA,8 in addition to the Administrative Procedure 
Act Section 706,9 and the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945.10 Part III addresses the Center case. I 
begin by summarizing the relevant facts and procedural posture of the case, highlighting 
Plaintiffs’ primary arguments, objections and responses by the Export-Import Bank 
(“Defendant”), and the Trial Court’s holding in Center on the parties’ cross-motions for 
summary judgment. Finally, based on my analysis of Center’s outcome, Part IV discusses how 
                                                 
2 About the Reef: Biodiversity, GREAT BARRIER REEF MARINE PARK AUTHORITY, https://perma.cc/ZX9B-XGLV 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2015).  
3 Dugong, scientific name Dugong dugon, are related to manatees and commonly called “sea cows.” Dugongs’ 
strictly habitat shallow salt-water oceans of the Indian and western Pacific Oceans. Dugong, WORLD WILDLIFE 
FUND, https://perma.cc/ZNM7-XATD (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) 
4 Id.; see also International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), World Heritage Nomination, IUCN Technical 
Review, Recommendation, para. 5 (July rev. 1981) (on file with the World Heritage Centre List for the Great Barrier 
Reef, https://perma.cc/46NW-VK5G) (last accessed Oct. 1, 2015). 
5 Euan McKirdy, Study: Over 90% of Great Barrier Reef suffering from coral bleaching, CNN (Apr. 20, 2016, 8:47 
AM), https://perma.cc/9AG5-9SS8; Michael Slezak, The Great Barrier Reef: a catastrophe laid bare, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2016, 7:54 PM), http://perma.cc/VTB5-F3A3. 
6Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, No. 4:12-cv-6325 SBA, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21481 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015). 
7 Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, as amended 16 U.S.C.S. § 1531 et seq. (2015).  
8Id.   
9 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966) (as amended).  
10 Export-Import Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.S. § 635 et seq. (2015). 
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Center fits into the broader legal framework of American jurisprudence on environmental issues 
and prior case law addressing Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Additionally, I discuss 
the potential impact Center could have on environmental litigation, especially the courts’ 
interpretation of the extraterritoriality application of Section 7 of the ESA and the international 
and administrative law concerns implicated by Center regarding the United States’ funding of 
international projects that threaten endangered species and habitats. 
 
II. APPLICABLE STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
 
 A better understanding of the significance of Center requires a survey of the statutory and 
jurisprudential history implicated by Plaintiffs’ argument challenging the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as applied to the Export-Import Bank’s funding of international projects and 
failing to follow Section 7 consultation requirements pursuant to the ESA. In this section, I begin 
by outlining the history and protection of the Great Barrier Reef, pursuant to the World Heritage 
Convention, 11  which the United States is a signatory pursuant to the National Historic 
Preservation Act.12 Next, I analyze Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, particularly the 
language “on the high seas” and the consultation requirement.13 Finally, I discuss the Export-
Import Bank Act of 1945,14 which authorized the creation of the independent agency, including 
the purpose and function of the Bank, and the Bank’s “Environmental and Social Due Diligence 
Procedures” 15  formulated to provide accountability and ensure the Bank’s compliance with 
applicable statutory law with the purpose of reducing impact to the environment in accordance 
with the Bank’s Charter and purpose of funding projects.16   
 
A. UNESCO & The World Heritage Convention: The Great Barrier Reef 
 
In 1981, the Government of Australia nominated the Great Barrier Reef (“Reef”), 
covering 348,700 square kilometers on the eastern coast of Queensland, Australia, to be listed as 
                                                 
11 54 U.S.C.A. § 300321 (2014).  
12 National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. § 300101 et seq. (2014), 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2, providing that before 
any Federal action is taken “outside the United States which may directly and adversely affect a property which is 
on the World Heritage List . . . the head of a Federal agency . . . shall take into account the effect of the undertaking 
on such property for purposes of avoiding or mitigating any adverse effects.” 54 U.S.C. § 307101(e) (2014), 80 Stat. 
915, 89 P.L. 665 (1966) (emphasis added); see also 54 U.S.C.S. § 300301 (1980) (providing that it is the explicit 
policy of the Federal Government of the United States to contribute, encourage, administer, and protect historic 
property for present and future generations); Exec. Order No. 11593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (May 13, 1971) (Executive 
Order for the “Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment,” signed by President Richard Nixon, in the 
furtherance of the policies of the United States to administer, initiate, and consult with the requisite and necessary 
agencies to secure the protection of important and valuable historical sites, structures, and objects, in accordance 
with the National Environmental Policy Act, the Historic Sites Act, and the National Historic Preservation Act). 
13 Endangered Species Act, supra note 7.  
14 Export-Import Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.S. § 635 et seq. (2015). 
15 “The Charter of the Export-Import Bank . . . requires the Bank to establish procedures to take into account the 
potential beneficial and adverse environmental effects of goods and services for which support is requested, 
consistent with the mandate to support U.S. jobs through exports.” Environmental and Social Due Diligence 
Procedures and Guidelines: Introduction, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK (revised Dec. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/Y2F8-
SDGF (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (emphasis added). 
16 See Export-Import Bank, EXIM Bank and the Environment, https://perma.cc/G4SS-4WLH  (last accessed Oct. 2, 
2015); see also Export-Import Bank Act, supra note 12 at § 635(a)(1) (The Bank’s objective is to provide funding to 
projects that will increase and contribute to employment for United States workers).   
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a World Heritage Site. 17  In July 1981, the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) 18  recommended that the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park “meets the criteria of the 
Convention and therefore should be placed on the World Heritage List.”19 Following IUCN’s 
recommendation to the World Heritage Committee, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) inscribed the Reef as property 154 to the World Heritage 
List.20 
The Reef provides a protected habitat for numerous endangered and threatened species of 
diverse marine life -- including marine turtles, a threatened dugong species, and over 250 species 
of coral.21 The United States is a party to the World Heritage Convention,22 thereby adopting the 
listing of the Great Barrier Reef as a World Heritage Site, codified and made applicable to the 
United States by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).23 The NHPA, codified at 16 
U.S.C.S. §§ 470 et seq. and amended in 1980, provides the purpose of ensuring “the preservation 
of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that its vital legacy of cultural, 
educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and 
enriched for future generations of Americans.”24 
The significant passage of the NHPA in the Center controversy provides a similar yet 
broader consultation requirement to the ESA: 
 
Prior to the approval of any Federal undertaking outside the United 
States which may directly and adversely affect a property which is 
on the World Heritage List . . . the head of a Federal agency . . . 
shall take into account the effect of the undertaking on such 
property for purposes of avoiding or mitigating any adverse 
effects.25 
 
This language ensures that any Federal agency action that “may directly and adversely affect” 
property outside of the United States which is on the World Heritage List, “take into account the 
effect of the undertaking” to avoid “adverse effects.” As such, the NHPA could also provide 
extraterritorial application of the NHPA to World Heritage designated properties that may be 
affected by United States Federal agency action. 
                                                 
17 World Heritage Nomination, IUCN Technical Review, Recommendation at para. 2. 
18 “IUCN co-drafted the World Heritage Convention text with U.N.E.S.C.O. in 1972 and is explicitly recognized 
within the Convention as the technical Advisory Body to the World Heritage Committee on natural World Heritage 
sites.” World Heritage Facts and Figures, IUCN (Dec. 17, 2012), https://perma.cc/Q3KX-ZNTC (last accessed Oct. 
1, 2015) (emphasis added). 
19 World Heritage Nomination, supra note 15 at para. 9.  
20 Nominations to the World Heritage List (inscribed sites), World Heritage Comm., 5th Sess., 003 CONF. VIII.15, 
https://perma.cc/K8C9-BGFN (last accessed October 2, 2016). 
21 Australian Government, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, supra note 2; see also World Heritage 
Nomination, supra note 2.  
22 States Parties Ratification Status, WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION, https://perma.cc/YM98-Y72S (last visited 
March 29, 2017). 
23 National Historic Preservation Act, supra note 10; e.g., World Heritage Convention 54 U.S.C.A. § 300321 (2013).   
24 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(4). 
25 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (emphasis added). 
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In 2015, the World Heritage Committee (“Committee”), after reviewing the “State of 
Conservation Report,”26 issued a decision “not[ing] with concern the conclusion of the 2014 
Great Barrier Reef Outlook Report that the overall Outlook for the property is poor, and that 
climate change, poor water quality and impacts from coastal development are major threats to 
the property’s health and regrets that key habitats, species and ecosystem processes [. . . ] have 
continued to deteriorate from the cumulative effects of these impacts.”27 The Committee also 
emphasized the potential for the Australian State to increase and prioritize efforts to prevent 
further industrial development, decrease in water quality, dredging of the property, and port 
expansions in order to institute and implement a robust “2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan.”28 
Most importantly, the Long-Term Sustainability Plan provides for the “establishment of an 80% 
reduction in pollution run-off in the property by 2025 and the commitment of an initial additional 
investment of AUS 200 million dollars to accelerate progress in water quality improvements.”29 
This highlights the Committee’s grave concern regarding the Reef’s overall health in relation to 
the continued and increasing industrial development inside the property.   
As a result of the Reef’s current jeopardized and threatened state of health, there is well-
founded concern that any further, increased development in and surrounding the Reef is in direct 
conflict with the Committee’s welcoming of the Australian State and the international 
community’s efforts to increase protection of the Great Barrier Reef from further deterioration.   
 
B. Section 7 of The Endangered Species Act of 1973 
 
The Endangered Species Act’s “Congressional findings and declaration of purposes and 
policy” provides that “the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the 
international community to conserve to the extent practicable the various species of fish or 
wildlife and plants facing extinction, pursuant to—(F) the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora; and (G) other international agreements.”30 The 
broad breadth of the language in this section titled “findings,” supports the understanding that 
Congress explicitly intended the language of the ESA to include the United States’ policies on 
endangered or threatened wildlife and habitats as it applies to Federal agency action in the 
international community. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that Congress 
explicitly intended the ESA to have broad application.31  
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA contains two key concepts at issue in the Center controversy: 
“agency action” and the “consultation” requirement for all agencies.32 The statute provides for 
the protection of endangered or threatened species or habitats stating, 
                                                 
26 Submitted by the Government of Australia, Property ID N154, State Party Report on the State of Conservation of 
the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area (Australia), in response to World Heritage Committee, WHC 38 Com 
7B.63 (Jan. 30, 2015).   
27 U.N.E.S.C.O. World Heritage Comm., 39 Sess., 39 COM 7B.7, WHC-15/39, para. 3 (2015) 
https://perma.cc/JQB4-SLWW (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (emphasis added).  
28 Id. at para. 4-7.  
29 Id. at para. 4(a). 
30 16 U.S.C.S. § 1531(a)(4) (emphasis added). 
31 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (“As it was finally passed, the Endangered Species Act of 
1973 represented the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any 
nation.”)  
32 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(a)(2); previously codified as Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973; see also 
42 U.S.C.S. § 4332(C)(v) (1970) “National Environmental Policy Act” (stating that “[p]rior to making any detailed 
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Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the 
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, 
funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section 
referred to as an ‘agency action’) is not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened 
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of 
habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary[.]33 
 
The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce have the responsibility of enforcing 
and administering the consultation requirement.34 The Secretaries have, in turn, delegated their 
responsibilities for the enforcement of the ESA to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
and the National Marine Fisheries Service (collectively, “Services”).35  
 The Services have defined “Action” to mean “all activities or programs of any kind 
authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or 
upon the high seas.”36 Furthermore, the Services have defined “Action area” to mean “all areas 
to be affected directly or indirectly by the Federal action and not merely the immediate area 
involved in the action.”37 The broad territorial application of the ESA by the Services, pursuant 
to the Secretaries’ delegated authority, reaffirms the purpose and policies of the ESA.  
Pursuant to the delegated authority from the Secretary of the Interior, the United States 
Fish and Wildlife Service has defined prohibitions on the jeopardizing and threatening 
endangered species and habitats in requisite territory. Section 17.21 subsection (c), titled “Take,” 
provides that  
 
it is unlawful to take endangered wildlife within the United States, 
within the territorial sea of the United States, or upon the high 
seas. The high seas shall be all waters seaward of the territorial sea 
of the United States, except waters officially recognized by the 
United States as the territorial sea of another country, under 
international law.38 
 
In so doing, this provision defines the “high seas,” with the exception of waters recognized by 
the United States, as the territorial sea of another sovereign pursuant to international law. 
However, the Services promulgated a final joint rule interpreting and limiting the extraterritorial 
                                                                                                                                                             
statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which 
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.”) (emphasis added). 
33 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(a)(2). 
34 “Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended,” 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (2016) 
(“Section 7(a)(1) of the [Endangered Species] Act directs Federal agencies, in consultation with and with the 
assistance of the Secretary of the Interior or of Commerce, as appropriate, to utilize their authorities to further the 
purposes of the Act by carrying out conservation programs for listed species.”) 
35 Id. at subsec. (b). 
36 “Definitions,” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016) (emphasis added). 
37 Id. 
38 United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, “Prohibitions,” 50 
C.F.R. § 17.21(c)(1) (2016); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (2016) (“in the United States or upon the high seas 
[that] is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species or results in the destruction or adverse 
modification of critical habitat.”) (emphasis added).  
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application of the ESA only to actions taken within the territorial United States or upon the high 
seas (thereby not requiring consultation in foreign countries).39  
Based on the policies and broad statutory language of the ESA and the Services joint rule 
reinterpreting the consultation language to extend to the “high seas,” Congress intended to 
provide sweeping protection of endangered habitats and species both in the United States and 
upon the high seas, given the irreversible harm that would come to the environment were the 
procedural requirements of the ESA not followed by the requisite agency before taking action.  
 
C. Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 
 
In 1945, Congress passed the Export-Import Bank Act creating the Export-Import Bank 
(“Bank”) corporation of the United States as a federal agency, tasked with the purpose of 
providing  
aid in financing and to facilitate exports of goods and services, 
imports, and the exchange of commodities and services between 
the United States . . . and any foreign country . . . and in so doing 
to contribute to the employment of United States workers. The 
Bank’s objective in authorizing loans, guarantees, insurance, and 
credits shall be to contribute to maintaining or increasing 
employment of United States workers.40 
 
Therefore, the Bank’s primary responsibility is to providing funding to facilitate the export and 
import of goods and services with the ultimate objective of contributing or increasing 
employment for American citizens.  
Due to the international implications of the Bank’s statutory authorization language, 
Congress provided a report to accompany the 1992 reauthorization of the Bank. This report 
indicates, amongst other issues, Congress’s concern regarding the environmental policy 
implications from the Bank’s funding of foreign projects. Therefore, the report amended the 
original Export-Import Bank Act to include Section 17 titled, “Environmental Policy and 
Procedures.”41  
The current Export-Import Bank Act provides for “Environmental policy and 
procedures”42 using similar language proposed by the 102nd Congress, Second Session. Notably, 
the language provided for in section (a)(1) requires that the Bank “shall establish procedures to 
take into account the potential beneficial and adverse environmental effects of goods and 
services for which support is requested under its direct lending and guarantee programs . . .  
including remediation or mitigation plans and procedures, and related monitoring reports.” 43 
Furthermore the statute requires that the environmental procedures must apply “to any 
transaction involving a project for which long-term support of $10,000,000 or more is requested 
from the Bank; for which the Bank’s support would be critical to its implementation; and which 
                                                 
39 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926-01, 19,929-19,930 (Jun. 3, 1986) (“The scope of these regulations has been enlarged to cover 
Federal actions on the high seas but has not been expanded to include foreign countries. [. . .] [T]he Service 
maintains its strong commitment to the preservation of species and habitat worldwide.”) 
40 “Powers and functions of the Bank,” 12 U.S.C.S. § 635(a)(1) (1945).  
41 138 Cong. Rec. H11340 Daily Ed. (Oct. 4, 1992) (“Section 106, amended by adding at the end of the following 
new section Sec. 17. ‘Environmental Policy and Procedures.’”). 
42 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(i)-5 (2006).  
43 Id. at § 635(i)-5(a)(1). 
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may have significant environmental effects upon the global commons or any country not 
participating in its project.” 44  Therefore, the Bank must consider and publicly disclose 
environmental reports and assessments for a wide range of funded projects at the international 
level.45 
 
1. The Export-Import Bank’s Environmental and Social Due Diligence Procedures 
 
Pursuant to the Bank’s “Environmental and Social Due Diligence Procedures,” in 
accordance with the Bank’s authorizing statute,46 the Bank defined “environmental impacts” as 
the “project-related impacts on the local communities directly affected by the project and the 
people involved in the construction and operation of the project.”47 Interestingly, however, the 
Bank has explicitly provided for environmental procedure review of “medium-term” 48  and 
“short-term”49 transactions. For long-term projects, the Bank has provided an environmental 
review when the project is expected to “produce direct CO2 emissions greater than 25,000 tons 
[sic].”50 Therefore, while the Bank has internal environmental and social procedures, the Bank is 
statutorily required 51  to complete and publicly disclose an environmental assessment report, 
including mitigation and remediation plans, for any long-term project that may have significant 
environmental impact. 
The statutory background, when taken in conjunction with the Bank’s internal social and 
environmental procedures, requires the Bank, as a U.S. Federal agency, to consult before funding 
projects that may significantly impact the environment. While conducting adequate consultation 
procedures may increase approval time for spending, Congress requires all federal agencies to 
follow this consultation procedure. The Center controversy challenges the extent to which the 
consultation procedure must be followed by a federal agency before funding is approved—
namely, does a federal agency have a responsibility and mandate to consult when the agency 
funding will apply extraterritorially and on the “high seas?” 
 
III. CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
The following discussion of the Center controversy is significant to American 
jurisprudence on the issues of the extraterritorial application of the ESA as it pertains to the high 
seas, the funding of foreign projects by American companies and Federal agencies, and the 
significance American courts place on the broad policy and impact of the ESA for securing the 
protection of endangered and threatened species and habitats. Although the Court ultimately 
granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds the Plaintiff lacked Article III 
                                                 
44 Id. (emphasis added).  
45 Id. at subsec. (1)(A), (B), (C).  
46 Id.; 12 U.S.C.S. § 635(a)(1). 
47 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, I. Overview of Ex-Im’s Environment and Social Due Diligence 
Procedures, para. 3, https://perma.cc/Y2F8-SDGF (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). 
48 Id. at para. 4 (defined in footnote 2 as those projects with funding under $10 million USD and projects that “have 
the potential for significant risks and impacts because they are to be carried out in a sensitive area or are likely to 
have an adverse impact on such an area.”). 
49 Id. at para. 5 (defined as having a “repayment term of less than two years.”). 
50 Id. at para. 9(1); see para. 8 (“when Ex-Im Bank receives and processes a final application for long-term financing 
for a project requiring review, it will follow the process set forth in 9 below.”). 
51 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(i)-5.  
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standing to sue, were the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse or another court to address a 
similar issue in the future, the ultimate Center outcome could impact how the United States 
funds projects outside the territorial United States, especially in the energy sector, which 
jeopardize ESA protected habitats and species. 
 
A. Facts & Procedural Posture 
 
The Export-Import Bank of the United States, an independent federal agency,52 provided 
nearly $4.8 billion USD to finance “the development and construction of two [LNG] projects 
[the Australia Pacific and Queensland Curtis LNG Projects] occurring partially in Australia’s 
Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area . . . . The projects will each include gas drilling, pipeline 
construction, construction of an LNG production facility and shipping terminal, and transport of 
LNG through the Great Barrier Reef to markets abroad,”53 including shipping on the high seas. 
In total, the LNG Projects will result in up to 16,000 coal-seam gas wells, install approximately 
510 miles of pipeline to transport the gas, and dredge the adjacent harbor to allow for 
international shipping of LNG through the Great Barrier Reef.54 Plaintiffs allege serious harm 
and damage to the Great Barrier Reef and endangered species and designated protected habitat 
including jeopardizing “high seas habitat for dugongs, sea turtles, [] several ESA-listed whales . . 
. and threatened saltwater crocodiles.”55 Plaintiffs’ complaint sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief to bring Defendants into compliance with the consultation requirements of the ESA, 
halting further funding of the LNG projects before any further damage is done to the Great 
Barrier Reef, endangered species, and protected species’ habitats. 
Plaintiffs, comprised of three environmental organizations, Center for Biological 
Diversity, Pacific Environment, and Turtle Island Restoration Network (“Plaintiffs”), 56 
commenced action against the Bank in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California in which the Bank subsequently filed a motion to transfer venue to the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia, which was ultimately denied.57 Following the 
Court’s decision denying the motion to transfer venue, the Bank filed a motion to dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ initial complaint alleging the Bank’s failure to comply with the “consultation 
obligations under § 7(a)(2) of the ESA,”58 contending that the Bank was “not required to consult 
[] prior to providing funding for the Projects because a federal agency funding a project in a 
foreign country does not have a duty to consult [] about the project’s impact on endangered 
species.”59 As such, the Court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss, holding that “it is unclear 
                                                 
52Ctr. for Biological Diversity, v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, No. 4:12-cv-6325 SBA, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 133694, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 17, 2013); 12 U.S.C. § 635(a)(1), supra note 9. 
53 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, No. 4:12-cv-12-6325 SBA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21481, at *3 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 20, 
2015). 
54 Id. at *4-5. 
55 Id. at *4-6; see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1980), as amended by Fish and Wildlife Service final rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 
8004-01 (Feb. 17, 2016). 
56 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133694, at *1. 
57 Id. at *12, *27 (the Court concluded that the Bank failed to meet their burden to demonstrate sufficient transfer of 
the case based on the factors concerning convenience and justice including, a court’s docket load, localized interests, 
and the acknowledgement of a plaintiff’s choice in forum).  
58 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111762, at *10 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 12, 2014); Cf. supra note 28 
(discussing the consultation requirement of the ESA, pursuant to the Secretary of the Interior and Commerce’s 
authority, as delegated to the Services). 
59 Id. (emphasis added). 
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whether Plaintiffs can allege additional facts to state a cognizable ESA claim, Plaintiffs’ ESA 
claim is dismissed with leave to amend.”60  
In 2015, following the initial motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs amended their complaint 
(Second Amended Complaint) against the Bank for financing liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
projects in Queensland, Australia, to include failing to consult with the appropriate federal 
environmental agencies 61  pursuant to and in violation of the ESA, 62  the National Historic 
Preservation Act,63 and the Administrative Procedure Act.64 In response to the Plaintiffs second 
amended complaint, the Bank “move[d] to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ESA claim for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.”65 The Bank contends that the Plaintiffs have not alleged 
sufficient facts to show that the Bank took an agency action that would trigger the consultation 
requirement under the ESA.66 Furthermore, the Bank argues that the shipping of the LNG on the 
high seas is not a component of the project for which the Bank provided funding. 67   On 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court found that the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs, were 
plausible to show that the Bank failed to consult with the Services, pursuant to Section 7(a)(2) of 
the ESA, before funding the LNG projects that would result, inter alia, in the shipping of LNG 
on the high seas and that the term “agency action” is interpreted broadly, supporting a plausible 
inference that the Banks’ actions could be subject to the ESA’s consultation procedure.68  
After discussing the Plaintiffs ESA claim and the history of the ESA,69 the Court held 
that “Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under the ESA that is 
plausible on its face, Defendants’ (Bank) motion to dismiss is denied.”70 In denying the Bank’s 
motion to dismiss, the Court analyzed both the history and text of Section 7 of the ESA in order 
to determine the scope and applicability, particularly the extraterritoriality interpretation, of the 
“agency action” and “high seas” language,71 and whether the Bank, as a federal agency, properly 
followed the ESA consultation requirement. The Court stated that “Defendants have not pointed 
to any facts in the documents properly before the Court or cited any authority supporting the 
                                                 
60 Id. at *17; see, e.g., note 21.  
61 Id. at *2. 
62 ESA § 7 (1973).  
63 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21481, at **6-7 (“According to Plaintiffs, the NHPA 
required [the] Bank to generate and consider information regarding the Projects’ impacts on the World Heritage 
Area, determine whether the effects will be adverse, develop modification to avoid or mitigate those impacts, and 
consult with Australia and other interested entities”); see, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. § 
300101 et. seq. (2014); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 4:12-cv-06325-SBA, Order on Cross-Motions for Summary 
Judgment, at *6, filed March 31, 2016 (“Plaintiffs further argue that the Bank’s funding constitutes a ‘Federal 
undertaking’ that may affect the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area, thus triggering the NHPA’s ‘take into 
account’ requirement.”).  
64 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(D) (providing for the “Scope of Review” by the reviewing court that “shall hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—without observance of procedure required by law).  
65 Center for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 2014 WL 6685739 at *1 (Oct. 10, 
2014, N.D. Cal.).  
66 Id. at *5. 
67 Id at *6-7 (pdf version).  
68 Center for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 2015 WL 738641 at *6 (Feb. 20, 
2015, N.D. Cal.).  
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id. at *4, 6. 
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conclusion that the scope of Export-Import Bank’s actions is limited to construction-related 
activities occurring within Australia and its territorial seas.”72  
Since the Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary 
judgment in March 2015, after which the Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment. In Defendant’s Opposition and Cross-Motion, their primary argument is that the 
action is not a justiciable controversy within the bounds of Article III standing.73 However, as a 
fall back argument, Defendants allege that the ESA does not require consultation under these 
circumstances and that the Bank took into account of the effect of the Projects’ environmental 
impact. 74  Conversely, citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 75  Plaintiffs argue that their 
“allegations are harms tied to procedural violations” and, therefore, according to Lujan, “the 
causation and redressability elements are relaxed” and can satisfy the standing requirements.76  
 
B. Case Analysis & Outcome 
 
The primary issue in the Center case is whether a United States federal independent 
agency can be found in violation of United States law for the funding of LNG projects upon the 
high seas that, allegedly, harms a number of endangered species and habitats in UNESCO Great 
Barrier Reef World Heritage Site.77  
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the Bank’s funding of nearly $4.8 billion dollars for the 
construction of two LNG projects in Queensland, Australia,78 partially in the Great Barrier Reef, 
constitute agency action on the high seas, pursuant to the ESA,79 by providing funding for 
dredging the harbor in order to develop shipping lanes through the Reef for the export of LNG.80 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that the Bank, as a federal agency, failed to consult with the 
Services and “take into account” the environmental impact that the LNG Projects would have on 
the Great Barrier Reef, endangered and threatened species, and habitats in the project area.81   
However, before addressing the merits of a case, Article III standing is a threshold matter 
and the Court was required, based on Defendant’s motion, to determine whether Plaintiffs had 
satisfied Article III standing requirements, thereby presenting a justiciable controversy for the 
court to resolve.82 The United States Supreme Court articulated three elements that must be 
satisfied for a Federal court to hear a “case or controversy” under Article III powers of the 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment No. 4:12-cv-06325-SBA, at *5 (May 20, 2015).  
74 Id. at *13.  
75 Ante at note 82, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.  
76 Id.  
77 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21481, at **3-6; accord Nominations to the World Heritage 
List, supra note 15. 
78 Id. at *3. 
79 Id. at *14; see also 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. 402.02 (defining “agency action”).  
80 Id.  
81 Id.; see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(c) (defining the extraterritorial application of “upon the high seas” language of the 
ESA); 50 C.F.R. 402.01; But cf. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926-01, 19,929-19,930 (Services promulgated joint rule limiting 
the extraterritorial application of “upon the high seas” and ESA language to not apply to foreign territories).  
82 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 US. 332, 342 (2006) (stating that standing to “invoke the authority of a 
federal court” is a “core component.”); see also, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93 
(1998) (standing is a prerequisite before a court will address the merits of a case presented). 
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United States Constitution.83 To satisfy the standing requirements, a plaintiff must show, at any 
point throughout the course of litigation, 
 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an 
invasion of a legally protected interested which is (a) concrete and 
particularized [. . . ] and (b) “actual or imminent”[.] Second, there 
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of[.] Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely 
“speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable 
decision.”84 
 
In summary, the plaintiff must establish (1) an injury in fact that is directly related to the agency 
action, (2) the plaintiff’s injury is causally connected to the agency action complained of, and (3) 
there must be redressability by the court. If the plaintiff fails to establish any of these three 
elements, a court will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.85  
A modification to the injury requirement set forth in Lujan is the “procedural injury” 
requirement where a plaintiff must show that the “procedures in question are designed to protect 
some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing.” 86 On the 
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs argued that they had a “recreational, 
economic, scientific, and aesthetic interest in the species and habitats of the Gladstone area and 
on the high seas” that is threatened by the “construction and operation of the Projects and the 
potential impact of the same on local species and habitat.”87 Defendants did not dispute that 
Plaintiffs could satisfy the causation requirement but argued that the Plaintiffs failed to establish 
causation and redressability.88 
 On parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court analyzed whether Plaintiff 
had shown a causal connection between the injury and conduct such that the injury was “fairly 
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.”89 To establish redressability, a plaintiff must 
show that the injury can be “‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”90 The Court noted that “a 
showing of procedural injury lessens their burden on the causation and redressability prongs of 
the Article III standing inquiry [such that] a party alleging procedural injury need only show a 
reasonable probability that the challenged action will threaten their concrete interests.”91 The 
Court’s causation analysis focused on whether the Plaintiffs had shown that the alleged unlawful 
lack of regulation could be sufficiently shown by Plaintiffs that the third party in this case, the 
operators of the Projects, could be responsive, e.g., suffer harm, were the Bank to cut funding to 
                                                 
83 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.   
84 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
85 Id. at 561 (“Since [the standing requirements] are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part 
of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proof.”). 
86 Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2003). 
87Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment No. 4:12-cv-06325-SBA, at *8 
(May 31, 2016).  
88 Id. at *9. 
89Id. at *8. (citation omitted); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citation omitted).  
90 Id. (citation omitted).  
91 Id. at *9 (citations omitted).  
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the Projects.92 To support this analysis, the Court cited St. Johan’s United Church of Christ v. 
FAA, stating that the outcome in that case was analogous to the facts as presented in Center.93 
The Court found that, as in FAA, plaintiffs challenging the agency’s funding of $29.3 million for 
the Chicago O’Hare Project could not satisfy the redressability requirement because the critical 
inquiry was “what would Chicago do” as a third party, not what would the agency do otherwise 
had it followed proper procedures.94  
Therefore, the Court found that the Plaintiffs had to provide “some basis for finding that 
the non-agency activity—construction and operation of the Projects—will be altered or 
affected.”95 The Court concluded that, based on Defendants’ presented evidence, “the Projects 
very likely will continue unimpeded, even if Plaintiffs obtain the relief sought” given the 
developers of the Projects and their “substantial commitment” and investment in the Projects.96 
The Court found it significant that the Defendant’s role in the Projects consisted of 
“approximately 10.5 percent and 9 percent of the total costs of the APLNG and QCLNG 
Projects, respectively[,]” as well as the fact that the QCLNG Project were already 46 percent 
complete by the time the Bank authorized the loan.97 The Court concluded that  
 
[g]iven the financial resources of the developers, their substantial 
commitment to the Projects, the relatively small fraction of the 
overall costs financed by Ex-Im Bank, and the availability of other 
funding sources, the Court finds that there is no reasonable 
probability the Projects will be halted if further financing by the 
Bank is impeded.98 
 
Although it would appear that the Court combined the causation and redressability analysis, the 
Court factually found that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy Article III standing requirements and 
ordered Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment denied and granted Defendants’ cross-
motion.99 Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on May 26, 2016.100 
 
IV. CENTER’S IMPACT ON FUTURE LITIGATION 
 
Center is an important case for American and International jurisprudence for a number of 
reasons, including the potential for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to 
apply the extraterritoriality canon of construction to the “high seas” language of Section 7 of the 
ESA, given the significance of the environmental issues at stake in Center regarding the erosion 
of a World Heritage Site, as well as the role that United States Federal agencies have in 
                                                 
92 Id. at *10 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562, “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly 
unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else . . . causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the 
response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction—and perhaps on the 
response of others as well.”). 
93 Id. at *11.  
94 Id. (citing St. John’s United Church of Christ v. FAA, 520 F.3d 460, 462-63 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at *12. 
97 Id. at *13. 
98 Id. at *14. 
99 Id. at *18. 
100 Center for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank, Notice of Appeal No. 4:12-cv-06325- 
SBA, at *2 (May 26, 2016). 
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significantly financing international projects and the impact that failure to follow proper 
consultation procedures has on judicial resources and the environment. 
 
A. “Agency Action” Analysis 
 
Although the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds 
that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy Article III standing, a key outstanding question is whether a court 
(particularly the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) will interpret “agency action” to include 
the Bank’s funding of the two LNG projects. I contend that because the ESA has been 
interpreted broadly, including the term “agency action,” this issue would likely resolve in favor 
of the Plaintiffs provided they survive the standing inquiry. 101  The Bank argued, in their 
Opposition Brief and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, that the funding “applies only to . . . 
development of gas fields in south central Queensland . . . and construction and operation of an 
LNG facility on Curtis Island at Gladstone.”102 Because the Bank’s funding did not apply to the 
shipping of the LNG on the high seas, the Defendants argued that the Bank’s “agency action” did 
not trigger the Section 7 consultation procedure. At most, the Bank argued, the “shipping of the 
LNG from the [Australia Pacific] Project to other countries [on the high seas] is a separate 
interrelated or interdependent action.”103  
However, the tension occurs with Congress’ broad definition of “agency action,” 
routinely upheld by courts including the Ninth Circuit, which seems to include the Bank’s 
funding as a necessary collateral consequence of the Projects—dredged and liquefied natural 
gas—requiring the LNG to be shipped elsewhere via the high seas for consumption and use 
outside of the United States’ jurisdiction. Further, the Bank’s funding of nearly $4.8 billion 
dollars to the Projects could be considered a substantial federal action taken by the Bank as a 
federal agency. 
 
1.     Interpretation of “Agency Action”  
 
The Court in Center reiterated the broad interpretation of “agency action” under Section 
7(a)(2) of the ESA. Significantly, the Court found that, in considering the Plaintiffs alleged facts,  
 
it is reasonable to infer that exporting LNG [liquefied natural gas] 
to destinations abroad is one of the primary objectives/components 
of the Projects, and because the term ‘agency action’ is interpreted 
broadly, Plaintiffs have pled facts plausibly showing that the . . . 
Bank violated § 7(a)(2) [of the ESA] by failing to consult with the 
Services.104 
 
The broad language and interpretation of “agency action” includes “all activities or programs of 
any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United 
                                                 
101 See supra note 77, 50 C.F.R. 402.02 (2009) (defining “action” to expressly include “all activities or programs of 
any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or upon the 
high seas.”) (emphasis added). 
102 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment No. 4:12-cv-06325-SBA, at *16 (May 20, 2015). 
103 Id. at *18.  
104 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21481, at *20. 
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States or upon the high seas.”105 The “agency action” in this case, by the Export-Import Bank, is 
the funding of nearly $4.8 billion USD to finance the construction, development, and export of 
LNG projects in Queensland and Curtis Island, Australia, and within the Great Barrier Reef 
World Heritage Area, resulting in the exporting of LNG across the high seas to various 
international markets.  
Congress promulgated a final rule on June 3, 1986, articulating interagency cooperation, 
under the Endangered Species Act, with the Secretary of the Interior and Commerce to ensure 
the consultation requirement of Section 7 is satisfied. 50 C.F.R. Part 402 provides that “the 
consultation process is designed to assist Federal agencies in complying with the requirements of 
section 7 and provides such agencies with advice and guidance from the Secretary on whether an 
action complies with the substantive requirements of section 7.” 106  Further, this final rule 
addressed many of the general comments proposed, including a thorough analysis of the section 
7’s consultation requirement. Notably, the analysis provides that 
 
Section 7 consultation will analyze whether the ‘effects of the 
action’ on listed species, plus any additional, cumulative effects of 
State and private actions which are reasonably certain to occur in 
the action area, are likely to jeopardize the continued existence of 
that species. Based on this analysis, the Federal agency determines 
whether it can proceed without exceeding the jeopardy standard. If 
the jeopardy standard is exceeded, the proposed Federal action 
cannot proceed without an exemption. . . . Congress did not intend 
that Federal actions be precluded by such speculative actions.107 
 
As such, it is clear that the Congressional intent for the passing of the Endangered Species Act 
and subsequent Agency interpretation and promulgated rules under the ESA provide for broad 
protection of endangered species and habitats through the use of agency consultation before 
agency action occurs.  
Further, 50 C.F.R. Part 402, under the heading Section 402.14 Formal Consultation, 
outlines that Section 7 and this rule affirm the requirement that “Federal agencies to review their 
actions to determine whether they ‘may affect’ listed species or critical habitat. . . . Federal 
agencies have an obligation under section 7(a)(2) of the Act to determine whether their actions 
may affect listed species and whether formal consultation is required under these regulations.”108 
The Ninth Circuit has articulated that “actions that have any chance of affecting listed species or 
critical habitat—even if it is later determined that the actions are ‘not likely’ to do so—require at 
least some consultation under the ESA.”109 
In order for Federal agency action to be exempt from Section 7(a)(2) consultation 
requirements, the agency must submit an application for exemption after which, the Secretary 
shall determine that the Federal agency as the exemption applicant has (i) “carried out the 
consultation responsibilities in good faith and made a reasonable and responsible effort to 
develop and fairly consider modifications or reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed 
                                                 
105 Supra note 34, 50 C.F.R. 402.02 “Definitions.” 
106 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (June 3, 1986). 
107 “Section 402.02 Definitions,” 51 Fed. Reg. 19,957 (June 3, 1986). 
108 “Formal Consultation,” 51 Fed. Reg. 19,961 (June 3, 1986) (emphasis added). 
109 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1027 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).  
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agency action which would not violate subsection (a)(2),” (ii) “conduct any biological 
assessment required by subsection (c),” and (iii) “refrain from making any irreversible or 
irretrievable commitment of resources prohibited by subsection (d).”110 In Center, the Bank did 
not apply for an exemption from the ESA’s consultation requirement under section 
1536(g)(3)(A).  
In the future, it is reasonable for a court to find that an agency’s funding constitutes 
“action” under the meaning of the ESA. This could provide an avenue for environmental 
organizations or other litigants to challenge environmentally detrimental policies, provided the 
plaintiff could satisfy jurisprudential requirements such as standing, ripeness, or mootness.   
 
B.   Extraterritoriality Application of the Endangered Species Act’s Consultation Requirement 
 
 The Supreme Court has long articulated that Congressional legislation will not extend 
beyond the jurisdiction of the United States absent express Congressional intent—this is the 
basic premise behind the presumption against extraterritoriality canon. 111   This canon of 
construction is the standard by which courts analyze statutes.112 However, courts have found 
statutes to require extraterritorial reach, based on Congressional intent to apply to international 
jurisdictions, including the Endangered Species Act.  The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
allows for judicial review of agency action if taken “without observance of procedure required 
by law.”113 
 In Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel,114 the Plaintiffs brought a challenge to the Secretary of 
the Interior’s promulgated regulation that limited the extraterritoriality application of the 
consultation provision of Section 1536 of the ESA. The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Minnesota found that Section 1536 of the ESA, titled “Interagency cooperation,”115 required 
federal agency cooperation and consultation with the Secretary “regarding any action which 
could jeopardize any endangered or threatened species. The language and mandate is all 
inclusive; it could not be more broad . . . .  Endangered species exist outside the boundaries of 
the United States and high seas.”116  
Further, the Court stated that “Congress’ concern with the international aspects of the 
endangered species problem is unmistakable and appears repeatedly throughout the statute. . . . 
[The] broad definition of ‘endangered species,’ combined with the general international concern 
of the entire ESA, must be considered in interpreting the consultation requirements of Section 
                                                 
110 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(3)(A).  
111 E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“It is a longstanding principle of American law 
‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.’”) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1957))  
112 Id. (“In applying this rule of construction, we look to see whether ‘language in the [relevant Act] gives any 
indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond places over which the United States has 
sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control.’” (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285)); See also Morrison 
v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).  
113 5 U.S.C.S. § 706(2)(A) (“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”), 
(C) (“short of statutory right”), and (D) (“without observance of procedure required by law.”) 
114 Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F.Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989), rev’d, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because 
Plaintiffs lacked standing).  
115 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).  
116 Hodel, 707 F. Supp. at 1084. (emphasis added).   
 251 
1536.” 117  Although the Hodel decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court in Lujan for 
Plaintiffs’ lack of standing, the extraterritoriality application of the ESA, pursuant to express 
Congressional intent, has importance with the Center decision given the international location of 
the Projects in the Great Barrier Reef.  
The “high seas” language, expressly included by Congress in defining “action” broadly, 
necessarily has extraterritoriality impact, requiring the United States, under the normative theory 
of jus cogens118 (an international theory of norms and obligations by the international community 
that are held for necessity purposes), to ensure that their legislative or law-making impact does 
not detrimentally affect the environment or endangered species, whether action occurs on the 
high seas 119  (area that is under no State’s control or legal reach) or under international 
jurisdiction. 
For instance, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,120 the Court held that the Alien 
Tort Statute121 did not apply extraterritorially and claims were barred as applying outside of the 
jurisdictional territory of the United States when conduct occurred only in foreign sovereign 
territory.122 However, the Court articulated that the presumption is typically applied “to discern 
whether an Act of Congress regulating conduct applies abroad. . . . It [] allows federal courts to 
recognize certain causes of action based on sufficiently definite norms of international law.”123 
Although the Court was constrained in this instance to hold that the presumption precluded a 
finding that the Alien Tort Statute did not apply extraterritorially, the Court did note that the 
principle underlying this presumption is to prevent the “danger of unwarranted judicial 
interference in the conduct of foreign policy[.]”124 
Justice Alito, in his concurrence, noted that unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to 
violate an international law norm “that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and 
acceptance among civilized nations . . . the cause of action will fall within the scope of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.”125Although the Sosa and Kiobel cases were concerned 
with extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute, the principles motivating the Court to 
decline application of U.S. law to international jurisdiction is of continued significance for 
Center.  
As in Hodel, the extraterritorial application of the consultation requirements of Section 7 
of the ESA is in accordance with not only express and broad Congressional intent but also with 
international law norms under jus cogens, as a universally held norm—to protect the world in 
which we live from preventative manmade environmental and biological destruction. Because 
the Great Barrier Reef in Center is a UNESCO World Heritage Site, recognized and codified in 
                                                 
117 Id. at 1085. 
118 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also Yousuf v. 
Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 775 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A jus cogens norm, also known as a ‘peremptory norm of general 
international law,’ can be defined as ‘a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.’”). 
119 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part VII, art. 86., 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. (1982) (“The Provisions of 
this Party apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in 
the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters or an archipelagic State.”). 
120 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). 
121 Codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) et. seq. 
122 Kiobel 133 S.Ct. at 1670. 
123 Id. at 1664.  
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 1670.  
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U.S. law, the presumption against extraterritorial application is overridden by the express intent 
and recognition that the funding of the LNG Projects by the Export-Import Bank, as a federal 
agency taking action, could be in violation of the consultation procedure required by the 
Endangered Species Act.  
Perhaps the most compelling U.S. Supreme Court precedent encouraging extraterritorial 
application for the ESA is RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,126 wherein the Court 
addressed whether the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961-1968, applied extraterritorially to “events occurring and injuries suffered outside the 
United States.”127 The Court stated that “[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the 
contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic application.” 128  The Court 
reiterated that unless the statute gives clear indication that Congress intended the statute to apply 
extraterritorially, the statute will be read to apply to conduct within the United States.129  
The Court summarized two cases in the past six years in which the Court was asked to 
determine whether the statute at issue applied extraterritorially: Morrison and Kiobel. 130  In 
Morrison, the issue before the Court was whether the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 
10(b), applied to the purchase or sale of securities on foreign exchanges.131 The Court held that 
section 10(b) did not provide clear Congressional intent for the statute to apply to extraterritorial 
action since the statute’s focus was domestic securities transactions. 132 In Kiobel, the Court 
addressed whether the Alien Tort Statute permits a federal court to have jurisdiction over three 
foreign corporations who committed international-law violations in Nigeria.133 Again, the Court 
concluded that the statute lacked any clear Congressional intent to extend the prohibited conduct 
to actions outside the jurisdiction of the United States.134 
In Nabisco, the Court emphasized the two-step framework adopted in Morrison and 
Kiobel for determining whether the presumption against extraterritoriality applied:135 
1. Has the presumption against extraterritoriality been rebutted—does the statute at issue 
provide a clear, affirmative indication it applies extraterritorially? 
2. If not, does the case involve a domestic application of the statute or did the conduct 
occur in a foreign country? 
The Court noted in Nabisco that if the answer at the second step involves foreign conduct then 
the presumption against extraterritoriality applies and the analysis ends due to an “impermissible 
extraterritorial application” of the statute. 136  However, if at step one the statute gives clear 
“extraterritorial effect,” then the issue for a court “turns on the limits Congress has (or has not) 
imposed on the statute’s foreign application, and not on the statute’s ‘focus.’”137 In so doing, the 
Court in Nabisco found that RICO plainly defined “racketeering activity to include a number of 
predicates that plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct.”138 The RICO statute includes 
                                                 
126 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S.Ct. 2090 (2016). 
127 Id. at 2096. 
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examples of criminal activity such as assassinating U.S. Government officials, when the 
defendant is a United States’ citizen but conduct occurs outside the United States, and if a 
hostage is a United States citizen. 139 Thus, the Court held that the RICO statute rebuts the 
presumption against extraterritorial application by giving clear, affirmative Congressional intent 
to apply to foreign conduct in certain circumstances.140 
As in Nabisco, the “high seas” language of the ESA provides clear Congressional intent, 
on the face of the statute, that the statute was intended to apply to a narrow range of foreign 
conduct (involving agency action that could jeopardize endangered species and habitats) and 
should be sufficient to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, contrary to the Court’s 
holding in Center. Based on my analysis of courts’ interpretations of Section 7 consultation 
requirements, as well as the recent Supreme Court holding in RJR Nabisco extending 
extraterritorial application of the RICO Act (albeit in part), the Bank’s funding would likely 
constitute “agency action” as defined by Congress under the ESA because Congress broadly 
wrote the ESA with the intention of granting broad authority to the Secretary of the Interior to 
protect endangered species and habitats. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the 
U.S. Supreme Court have interpreted the ESA to apply extraterritorially given broad express 
Congressional intent.141  
 
1.    High Seas Discussion 
 
Since the high seas are not subject to the law of a sovereign territory or state, the turning 
point for extraterritoriality application of the ESA will depend on the language of the ESA and 
Congressional intent to determine whether the canon of construction for the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies in this matter.142  More importantly, as it applies to Section 7 of the 
ESA, Congress has defined “action” broadly to mean “all activities or programs of any kind 
authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or 
upon the high seas.”143 As such, there is no question that when a court is faced with determining 
whether the agency action required consultation, the action will be interpreted broadly to include 
a presumptive extraterritoriality reach. The question then becomes whether the agency properly 
                                                 
139 Id. 
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141 See generally Hodel,707 F.Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989). 
142 The Supreme Court has held that there is a presumption against extraterritoriality application of statutes, unless 
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143 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009) (emphasis added).  
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complied with the consultation procedure requirement or satisfied the exemption requirements 
under § 1536(g)(3)(A).   
 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has defined what area 
constitutes the “high seas,”144 although it is important to note that the United States has not 
ratified the Convention at this time. 145  Article 86 of UNCLOS titled, “Application of the 
provisions of this Part,” provides that the high seas are, “not included in the exclusive economic 
zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an 
archipelagic State.”146 Article 87 provides, under the heading “Freedom of the high seas,” that 
the “high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. . . . These freedoms shall be 
exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the 
freedom of the high seas[.]”147  
 In the Center case, the Court’s finding of facts, regarding the high seas and application of 
the ESA, centered on Export-Import Bank’s funding of the two liquefied natural gas projects that 
require shipping of the gas across the high seas. However, in denying Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss, the Court did find that Plaintiffs sufficiently pled facts that could plausibly show that the 
funding will provide for shipping of the liquefied natural gas across the high seas.148 Because 
Section 7 of the ESA has been interpreted to include “the high seas,”149 a plaintiff could argue 
that the ESA consultation clause requires extraterritorial application when triggered by “agency 
action.” 
C. Broader Implications 
 
1. How Center Fits Within Existing Case Law 
 
Three Ninth Circuit cases 150  and a Supreme Court case 151  provide a historical and 
contextualized jurisprudential framework for understanding the outcome of Center. Tennessee 
Valley Authority v. Hill152 is one of the most influential Supreme Court cases involving the ESA. 
The Court stated that, “the Endangered Species Act of 1973 represented the most comprehensive 
legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.”153 TVA v. Hill 
is particularly applicable to the Center controversy because the Plaintiffs brought a challenge to 
enjoin the construction of a “virtually completed [Tellico] dam” 154 due to the failure of the 
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Tennessee Valley Authority to properly conduct environmental impact studies, pursuant to the 
NEPA and ESA, which, had the studies been conducted, would have shown that a new species of 
perch, the snail darter, existed.155  
The Court ultimately affirmed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision to enjoin the 
completion of the Tellico Dam by relying on the fundamental principle of separation of powers, 
concluding that “once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality 
determined, the judicial process comes to an end.”156 The Court’s holding in TVA v. Hill, 
upholding the constitutionality of the ESA’s consultation requirements, has direct implications 
on the Center controversy by recognizing the separation of powers and significance of the ESA’s 
purpose to provide robust protections for the environment and endangered species.  
In Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. United States Forest Service,157 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the grounds that “There is 
‘agency action’ under Section 7 of the ESA whenever an agency makes an affirmative, 
discretionary decision about whether, or under what conditions, to allow private activity to 
proceed.” 158 The “may affect” language of Section 7 of the ESA applies broadly to any agency 
action.159 In this case, the Court held that because the mining activities “may affect critical 
habitat of coho salmon in the Klamath River system[,] [t]he Forest Service therefore had a duty . 
. . to consult with the relevant wildlife agencies before approving the [notices of intent].”160  
By reversing the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Supreme Court’s 
precedent in TVA v. Hill that Section 7 of the ESA was congressionally intended to require any 
federal agency who takes any action, including issuing notices of intent, to consult with the 
respective agencies if the agency action may affect any biological or environmental habitat. 
Going one step further, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher,161 the Court addressed 
whether the Defendants’ (the Export-Import Bank’s acting President and Chairman) funding of 
an international project that emitted greenhouse gases were in violation of the National 
Environmental Policy Act. At the summary judgment stage, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ 
motion and granted the Defendants’ motion (in part) because the Court could not “determine 
whether or not the individual projects identified [. . .] qualify as major federal actions [and 
therefore], the Court cannot determine whether any of these actions would qualify as ‘cumulative 
actions’ that would require a single EIS [Environmental Impact Study] under NEPA.”162 Most 
notably, however, the Court found that the “Plaintiffs’ claims did not involve extraterritorial 
application of NEPA” because Plaintiffs made  
 
clear that they seek to apply NEPA because the projects that 
Defendants support purportedly significantly affect the domestic 
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environment. In addition, Defendants do not claim that the 
decision about whether or not to support such projects occur 
abroad. . . . Finally, notwithstanding Defendant’ arguments 
regarding foreign policy relations, there  is evidence to suggest 
that the Defendants may have control over the manner in which 
these projects operate.161  
 
Mosbacher suggests that because the Bank provided funding and, arguably, maintains 
some significant amount of control over the projection operations, the issue of extraterritoriality 
application of the ESA in Center seems to be minimized by the Court’s denial of the Bank’s 
motion for summary judgment in Mosbacher. This is based on the Court’s application of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality in Mosbacher and the ESA’s broad statutory language 
expressly providing for “high seas” application.  
In Conner v. Burford,163 a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case, the Plaintiffs, 
wildlife activists, brought suit against the Director of the Bureau of Land Management and Oil 
Companies for leasing oil and gas projects on 1.3 million acres of nationally protected forest land 
in Montana without the Bureau conducting an environmental impact study under the ESA and 
NEPA.164 Most applicable to Center, the Court in Conner highlighted the district court’s ruling 
that the  
 
biological opinions of the FWS (the Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
designated federal agency under the ESA) were inadequate to 
satisfy the ESA because they failed to address the effects of oil and 
gas activities beyond the lease sale phase. The court reasoned this 
failure would lead to a piecemeal evaluation of the project 
consequences and a progressive ‘chipping away’ of important 
habitat.165   
 
Further, the Court’s ESA discussion highlighted the failure of the Forest Service to notify 
the Secretary of the Interior of the sale of oil and gas leases that “might affect threatened and 
endangered species living there, including the grizzly bear, the bald eagle, the peregrine falcon, 
and the gray wolf.”166 Most notably, however, the Court discussed the scope of the biological 
opinions or environmental studies, pursuant to the ESA, including the interpretation of “agency 
action.” 167  In so doing, the Court emphasized the scope of the ESA requirement applies 
“broadly”168 and that the “scope of the agency action is crucial because the ESA requires the 
biological opinion to analyze the effect of the entire agency action.”169 The Court concluded that 
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the ESA requires comprehensive consultation and issuance of biological opinions and does not 
permit “incremental” studies. 170 
The above cases are consistent with my argument that ESA, as interpreted, applies to any 
agency action, in the broadest sense, and mandates that the agency complete the necessary 
impact studies at every step of the funding. This is supported by the above analysis of courts 
holding that Congress’ purpose in passing the ESA was to ensure broad and comprehensive 
protection for endangered species and the environment and, in so doing, requires the Secretary of 
the Interior to ensure federal agency compliance with the ESA consultation requirement.  
An analogous case to the issue of standing presented in Center that could result in the 
Ninth Circuit reversing the District Court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment is Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson.171 In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, a 
recent case from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, a group 
of Plaintiffs alleged adverse environmental impact associated with global warming and climate 
changes caused by two federal agencies—the Export-Import Bank and OPIC (Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation)—funding projects throughout the country without complying with the 
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4335, and the APA.  
In Watson, the Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment holding that 
Plaintiffs had standing. 172  To satisfy the injury prong, the Court held that the Plaintiffs 
demonstrated “that it is reasonably probable that the challenged action will threaten their 
concrete interests . . . the only uncertainty is with respect to how great the consequences will be, 
and not whether there will be any significant consequences.”173 Significantly, the Court reiterated 
the “lower threshold for causation in procedural injury cases” as applied to Plaintiffs for a 
challenge under the NEPA and the APA, stating “when a plaintiff asserts a procedural injury, 
such as a plaintiff challenging an agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement 
for a proposed dam, the [] plaintiff would have standing to challenge the agency’s 
conduct[.]” 174 To meet the third prong of redressability, the Court found that Plaintiffs 
sufficiently demonstrated that “the agency’s decision could be influenced by the environmental 
considerations that [the relevant public statute] requires an agency to study.”175 Most notably, 
Plaintiffs identified seven projects funding by OPIC and Ex-Im, including building a pipeline for 
transportation of oil from Chad-Cameroon, a coal power plant in China, an offshore oil and gas 
production facility in Indonesia, crude oil development in Venezuela, oil and gas production 
facilities in Mexico, and offshore gas and oil fields in Russia.176 The Court ultimately denied 
parties’ cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of extraterritorial application. 
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 Although Watson ended in a settlement,177 Watson provides a significant lens through 
which to analyze the post-Center implications, especially on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, 
regarding standing for environmental organizations to challenge agency action and failure to 
comply with the consultation procedures of environmental statutes. Specifically, by applying a 
more relaxed causation requirement for asserted procedural injuries, it seems that the hurdle for 
establishing Article III third-party standing is to prove that the plaintiffs and their members have 
a distinct and cognizable injury in fact. Additionally, if on appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirms the 
Center judgment granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Watson seems to indicate 
that the NEPA and its potential to reach activities abroad could provide an alternative avenue for 
challenging environmentally detrimental government action, especially considering the trial 
court concluded that the Plaintiffs in Watson satisfied standing and permitted the jurisdictional 
issue of whether the NEPA could apply to foreign conduct by government agencies to proceed to 
trial.178   
 
2. Administrative Law and Policy Concerns 
 
Post-Center, it is likely that extraterritorial application of the consultation procedures 
under the ESA will occur in factually limited circumstances and only extended to situations in 
which the endangered environment is another UNESCO World Heritage Site or another 
significantly held species or habitat of great cultural importance that would be irrevocably 
altered or destroyed by the federal agency action.  
The statutory construction of the ESA has been relatively consistent and stable since TVA 
v. Hill. An interesting question will arise if the Department of Fish and Wildlife promulgates a 
rule adverse to recent federal court holdings interpreting the ESA broadly. Post-Center, it is 
likely that an extraterritorial application of statutes, absent an express statement by Congress, 
will not be a likely successful avenue for environmental non-profits and other organizational 
plaintiffs to challenge United States federal action abroad. However, this prediction runs counter 
to the ESA’s broad application and grant of authority intended by Congress. Further, the purpose 
of the ESA is to protect endangered species and habitats from irreversible destruction caused by 
federal agencies. Most notably, the issues in Center are not what the agency has power to do but 
what the agency did by failing to consult. Further, I would contend that the Bank funded a 
project that would directly impact the Great Barrier Reef—a designated World Heritage Site—
thereby taking an obvious risk by failing to consult funding, potentially jeopardizing the Reef 
and the protected habitat and species residing therein.  
 
3. International Law  
 
A final impact post-Center is the significance of the Great Barrier Reef and U.S. 
recognition of the United Nations, particularly the recognition of culturally and historically 
significant properties or landmarks throughout the world. Interestingly, the United States is not a 
party to the UNCLOS.179 
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 Part of the UNESCO Site designation is to protect cultural and historically significant 
sites from destruction. 180  Specifically, the UNESCO World Heritage website states that 
UNESCO “seeks to encourage the identification, protection and preservation of cultural and 
natural heritage around the world considered to be of outstanding value to humanity. This is 
embodied in an international treaty called the Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, adopted by UNESCO in 1972.”181 Currently, there are 
1,031 properties on the World Heritage List, residing in 163 party States, with 48 sites currently 
in danger and 802 sites designated as having cultural value.182 Without UNESCO and global 
environmental nonprofit organizations, these 1,031 (and growing) sites would likely be 
destroyed by war, environmental decay (both natural and human-made), and human destruction, 
whether intentional or inadvertent. The important component to this analysis, however, is the 
impact that international law and U.S. jurisprudence has in ensuring the protection of endangered 
environments and species from intentional or secondary destruction by human action that could 
have been prevented.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The Endangered Species Act was enacted in 1973 with the express purpose of broadly 
protecting endangered species and their endangered habitats from governmental agencies 
funding and constructing projects that irreversibly cause detrimental harm to protected species, 
habitats, and the environment. Challenges to the application and interpretation of the ESA’s 
broad statutory language have caused courts to strike a balance between the protection of 
endangered habitats and species and deferring to federal agency action. The United States 
Supreme Court has held that “[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute [ESA] was to 
halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only 
in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute.”183 
The Great Barrier Reef is a protected UNESCO World Heritage Site home to some of the 
world’s most diverse species of dugong, coral reefs, and marine turtles,184 as well as a cultural 
and social heritage site for Australians and other indigenous populations in the area. Given broad 
Congressional intent for the ESA to apply to any “agency action,” including on the “high seas,” 
the Export-Import Bank’s funding of nearly $4.8 billion USD for two LNG projects in the Great 
Barrier Reef is likely to be enjoined by the Court until the Bank completes the consultation 
obligation pursuant to the ESA and NHPA.  
 When the World Heritage Site listed the Great Barrier Reef, pursuant to Criterion X, 
UNESCO emphasized the unique, breathtaking, and expansive quality of the Reef, noting the 
“enormous size and diversity of the GBR means it is one of the richest and most complex natural 
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ecosystems on earth, and one of the most significant for biodiversity conservation. The amazing 
diversity supports tens of thousands of marine and terrestrial species, many of which are of 
global conservation significance.”185 It cannot be overstated how culturally and environmentally 
important the Great Barrier Reef is to global society to ensure preservation of this World 
Heritage Site.  
It is intuitively reasonable that, pursuant to the ESA, the Export-Import Bank, as an 
independent federal agency, is required to follow the statutorily mandated consultation 
procedures before and during the financing of the projects to ensure that no further damage or 
destruction occurs to this unique and internationally protected ecosystem. The more difficult 
question for courts is to what extent will a U.S. federal agency be held responsible for failing to 
comply with American law extraterritorially? I think the answer to this question relies on the 
intersection of Administrative, International, and Environmental jurisprudence.  
The outcome in Center is not a surprising decision and is well within courts standing 
analysis, especially considering the argument of extraterritorial application of the ESA. 
However, I contend that due to the growing number of endangered species and habitats, 
especially those added every year to the World Heritage and UNESCO classifications,186 the 
funding of projects by American agencies will require an increase in assurance that the agencies 
are following proper consultation procedure in accordance with the broad Congressional 
protections afforded by Section 7 of the ESA. Although Center was decided on the basis of 
Article III standing, this case could be extremely influential for environmental organizations to 
develop a litigation strategy aimed at encouraging the Federal government to develop more 
environmentally protective policies.  
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